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Introduction
In this paper, we recover the history of the Crisis of 1889, when the Banque de France (BdF) quickly intervened, ensuring that a run on the Comptoir d'Escompte (CdE), one of the largest banks in France, did not turn into a general panic. The remedy for this banking crisis, the most severe in late nineteenth century France, was not a pure British Bagehot-style lender of last resort operation (LOLR) but a divisive and contested intervention, resembling more a modern "lifeboat" or "bailout" operation, supplemented by additional liquidity for the market. By providing loans to the insolvent CdE, the BdF guaranteed that depositors would have continued access to their accounts while the bank was liquidated in an orderly fashion and a new bank was Yet, in contrast to the modern experience with lifeboats the BdF and the Ministry of Finance, backed by the contemporary French legal system, took prompt actions in 1889 that had the potential to mitigate this problem. Banks, including their management and directors, that had contributed to the debacle were quickly compelled to absorb losses arising from the collapse of the CdE; many officials were purged; and other penalties imposed. This strong response may have contributed to the absence of major crisis in France for the next quarter century.
This type of central bank intervention would appear to be ruled out in the U.S. today. In reaction to the Federal Reserve's lending programs during the financial crisis of 2008, the DoddFrank Act of 2010 altered Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act that had, since 1932, given the Fed discretionary authority to lend to "any individual partnership, or corporation" in "unusual and exigent circumstances." The Fed used this authority beginning with the Great Depression through the Crisis of 2008 (Fettig, 2008) , though there were long-standing complaints that it had been misused (Schwartz, 1992; Goodfriend, 2012) . Emergency assistance in Section 13(3) now requires that the Board of Governors consult with the Secretary of the Treasury, before implementing a new lending program, which should provide liquidity to the financial system, not aid an insolvent or failing firm and be collateralized sufficiently to protect taxpayers (U.S. Senate, 2010; Office of Inspector General, 2010) . While this policy shift implies that there is no case to be made for pre-emptive intervention with insolvent firms, the French experience in 1889 may suggest otherwise.
After reviewing the extant literature, we describe the origins of the crisis, arising from an effort to control the world copper market and measure the damage inflicted on the CdE. In the third section, we examine whether the run on the bank had begun to spread before the authorities intervened and detail the debate at the BdF and Ministry of Finance over the plan to rescue the CdE. Next, we show that the BdF's intervention was primarily a lifeboat operation with modest extra liquidity supplied to other banks and the markets. Fifthly, we analyze the determinants of membership in and contributions to the guarantee syndicate, intended to absorb losses from the lifeboat operation, finding that, in addition to capacity to pay, responsibility for the debacle was an important factor. In the final section, we discuss the penalties imposed in the aftermath of the crisis that may have minimized the moral hazard arising from the BdF's actions.
A Lost Episode
Our article seeks fill an important gap in the literature of the evolution of the lender of last resort (LOLR) function of central banks, drawing on archival materials at the BdF and other primary sources. Often influential in contemporary policy debates, historical evidence on how a central bank should operate as a LOLR is primarily informed by the classical view of the Bank of England (BoE), first put forward by Henry Thornton (1802) and reaffirmed by Walter Bagehot (1873) . They ordained that a central bank should respond to a financial crisis by lending freely at a high rate of interest on all good collateral, preventing illiquid but not insolvent banks from failing. Summarizing this view, Humphrey (1975) and Bordo (1990) point out that it was not the duty of the LOLR to prevent financial shocks but neutralize them once they had occurred by preventing the spread of a panic from failing insolvent institutions to sound ones.
To be successful, a central bank must clearly state its policy in advance and follow through consistently. .
Recent research on the BoE has identified when and how it became a LOLR. Before the Overend-Gurney Crisis of 1866, the Bank rationed credit, exacerbating panics. Afterwards, it set the bank rate above the market rate, providing loans to all that had good collateral, as determined by the Bank's meticulous bookkeeping (Bignon, Flandreau, and Ugolini, 2012; Flandreau and Ugolini, 2013) . With more limited data, Bignon, Flandreau, and Ugolini (2013) also find that after the 1850s, the BdF's discount policy followed a similar evolution. But, central banks did not simply follow Bagehot's advice in the late nineteenth century. Unfortunately, the secondary literature on the BoE has paid little attention to the lifeboat operation during the 1890 Barings crisis. Clapham's (1945) classic history provides the most detailed but still very limited account. Calomiris (2011) correctly recognized its importance in a brief passage, with Giannini (2011) suggesting that support for the CdE in 1889 was a model for the BoE's action the following year.
In France, the first major lifeboat was launched to rescue the Paris Bourse in 1882 (White, 2007) .
Contemporaries were aware of the dangers of such actions, and the 1889 lifeboat provoked an intense debate by policy makers on the proper role for a LOLR. 1 Researchers curious about the BdF as a LOLR might reasonably turn to the studies of the U.S. National Monetary Commission (1909) (1910) (1911) (1912) , prepared as the U.S. Congress considered the establishment of the Fed. Two volumes treat the BdF; yet, the first (Liesse,1909) gives only a cursory description of the 1889 rescue and the second (Patron, 1910) omits it entirely, which may have led modern authorities on central banking (Goodhart, 1988; Grossman, 2010) There is no fixed rule, and although the balance of the account is not a matter of indifference, it is more especially the quality of the paper presented which fixes the extent of the credit. In periods of crisis in 1830, 1848, in 1870 in 1889, the general council of the Bank did not hesitate to come to the assistance of establishments which were in difficulties, but which held assets of unquestioned character and value, by extending to them the largest possible credits (Aldrich, 1910, p. 207) .
The Governor may have been citing the BdF's statutes, but they were not the rules the BdF played by during the Crisis of 1889, as the CdE was deeply insolvent.
The French literature is not much more illuminating. Published in an obscure mining journal, the best study of the events leading to the collapse of the CdE is by Bertrand Gille (1968) . Yves Mollier (1991) The BdF's very success at preventing the run on the CdE, which today would be termed a "systemically important financial institution"-a "SIFI"-from creating a panic may be responsible for its low historical profile.
We reconstruct this history from contemporary records, most notably from the archives of the BdF and the other leading banks, and new data from a variety of long-overlooked sources.
A Scheme to Corner the Copper Market, Its Failure, and the Crisis
In the 1880s, the French banking industry was split into two basic groups: (1) the large limited liability banks that raised substantial funds from deposits and engaged in a wide range of commercial and investment banking activities -Crédit Lyonnais, Société Générale, the CdE, and the Banque de Paris et de Pays-Bas (BPPB), dominated this group; and (2) the private banks that focused on merchant and investment banking, financed mostly by capital-the biggest private banks were known as the haute banque, led by the Paris House of Rothschild. In this period, there was no deposit insurance or implicit guarantees of banks, and rumors of a bank's troubles could cause a run. As the economy had been in the doldrums since the stock market crash of 1882 (Bouvier, 1960; White, 2007) with real GDP failing to reach its previous peak until 1888 (Lévy-Leboyer and Bourguignon, 1990) , banks saw their profits squeezed and shareholders their dividends shrink. were widely known and discussed in the press, even though the details of his machinations remained obscure and the subject of rumors. In essence, the SdM became a highly leveraged commodities company that used off-balance sheet derivatives to speculate in copper.
Industrial and agricultural demand for copper had expanded rapidly during the 1880s.
New uses were found for copper, from cables for transmission of electricity to copper sulfate to battle the scourge of phylloxera in the vineyards. World production increased from approximately 20,000 tons per year in the middle of the century to 250,000 tons by 1888.
Although Chile and Australia had traditionally been the dominant suppliers, an increasing share of production came from the U.S., where new mines were opened in the 1880s. In spite of an increasing demand, these new supplies drove prices down from over £70 a ton in the early 1870s
to £40 a ton in 1886.
In September 1887, Secrétan organized a syndicate composed primarily of members of the haute banque to provide credit to purchase existing stocks of copper. Purchases drove up prices from £40 per ton to over £80 by December 1887. As seen in Figure 1 In spite of Secrétan problems in obtaining additional finance to sustain the price of copper, the market did not register any apprehension throughout the summer and fall of 1888.
As evident in Figure 2 , the public did not perceive that there was any danger to the banks. All bank stocks, even those of the CdE and the BPPB, remained essentially flat for the rest of the year. The SdM reached a peak of 975 francs in September 1888 and drifted down towards 900 at years end, reflecting the rising stocks of warehoused copper in Figure 1 that the market observed. Table 1 gives an estimate based on the March 1 information. Line 1 represents the credits of the CdE, largely discounts on copper warrants to the SdM. In addition, the CdE was liable for the SdM's copper warrants that were discounted at the BdF because it had given a guaranteeing signature. This obligation is shown on line 2; so that the total obligation of the SdM to the CdE was 96.2 million francs (the sum of lines 1 and 2). Line 3 shows the total liabilities and capital of the SdM, 276.3 million. From this sum, the credits from the Compagnie Auxiliare de Métaux in line 5 and the SdM's equity capital in line 4 need to be subtracted. The debt of the SdM to outside creditors was thus 224.6 million francs, as seen on line 6. The 96.2 million francs due to the CdE represented 43% of this total, shown on line 7. Against these liabilities, the SdM had 154,900 tons of copper (line 8), which if valued at the March 1st price of £40 per ton, represented assets of 156.1 million francs listed on line 9. If we suppose that the CdE's share of this collateral is the same as its share in SdM's debts (an optimistic hypothesis), the CdE's share of these assets would be 66.9 million francs on line 10. Then the loss to the CdE Consequently, in most optimistic case, the CdE needed the guarantees to be abandoned in order to survive; in the second one it had to be liquidated even if the guarantees were to be abandoned; in the third and more likely case, it was deeply insolvent. Depositors rightly fled, when knowledge of this situation become public. .
The Creation of a Lifeboat
On the evening of March 7, 1889 following two days of steady withdrawals of deposits and a failed private attempt to raise support for the CdE, the Minister of Finance, Maurice Rouvier, summoned the Governor and leading bankers to his office. 6 Although there are no records of this late night meeting, it was certainly tense, lasting from 10 p.m. to 2 a.m. The Minister was blunt: if the CdE did not receive 100 million francs before opening, the rising number of withdrawals would force it to stop payments. The Minister expected the BdF to lend 100 million francs, with the CdE's entire assets serving as a guarantee. This request was in violation of the statutes of the BdF, which required that discounts only be provided for three name paper or two name paper collateralized by the highest quality securities. To protect the BdF against potential losses, the Minister required the formation of a syndicate of banks to absorb any losses up to 20 million francs.
At 9 a.m. the following morning, Friday, March 8, 1889, an hour before banks opened for business, the Governor convened an extraordinary meeting of the regents There is no doubt that this imposes a heavy obligation on the Banque, but M. le Gouverneur hopes that the good faith shown to the Comptoir would ease that responsibility and that the Banque would be rewarded for its self-sacrifice and confidence. He chose the word good faith because a moral guarantee [underlined in the minutes] is, perhaps, what is required. A standard approach is not sufficient. If the Banque agrees to come to the aid of the Comptoir under these conditions, it will have rendered a great new service to the Parisian financial market, business in general, and the nation. Following this declaration to aid an insolvent institution, the Governor faced hostile questioning rarely seen in the minutes of the Council.
The industrialist Fernand Raoul-Duval observed that some of the guarantors for the BdF loan were "notoriously involved in the copper syndicate" and asked whether there was reason to fear that the collateral was inadequate. This question was inflammatory, given that some of the signatories were regents' banks. One target, André, responded simply that the guarantees were sufficient. Next, Pillet-Will spoke of the great risk to which the BdF would be exposed by this credit and pointed out that even if the CE's assets were acceptable as collateral, their transfer to the BdF might be contested by other creditors. He estimated that a guarantee of 75 not 20 million francs was necessary. André countered that it was impossible to follow the rules; the key was to stop the panic. Opponents of the Minister's proposal demanded further assurances for the BdF, but supporters argued that there was no time left. When the proposal was put to a vote, eleven regents voted for and four against, barely reaching the required super majority for the motion to pass. The defeated regents were enraged. Pillet-Will felt that he and the BdF had been betrayed by the insiders---including Rothschild. In an act without precedence since the founding the Banque, Pillet-Will resigned in protest: after three generations, his family;s bank now no longer had a representative on the Council of Regents.. The CdE quickly drew on its loan to meet the demands of depositors, taking 94 of the 100 million francs by March 15. 1889.
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Even though it was initially believed that the CdE had sufficient good assets to cover any liabilities beyond the 100 million franc loan, it became obvious there was a gaping hole in its balance sheet. On Saturday, March 16, 1888, the Governor and representatives of the leading banks were again summoned to a meeting at the Ministry of Finance. The bankers were informed that the Minister wanted the creation of a new institution to replace the CdE and that a new 40 million francs loan from the BdF was required to prevent the CdE bank from collapsing. For this credit, there would be a new guarantee syndicate of banks to cover the first 20 million francs of losses. The question whether the BdF's quick intervention prevented a panic presents a difficult counterfactual that runs would have been limited to the CdE because the public could determine whether other banks were solvent. But, to use an anachronistic term, the CdE was a "systemically important financial institution" and neither the Minister of Finance nor most of the Council wanted to chance a panic. Regents on opposite sides of the debate agreed that a panic caused by the CdE would be severe. Rothschild wrote to his London cousin that such a crash would "hit the commercial and financial center even harder than the collapse of Union Générale;" while Pillet-Will told his fellow regents that "the fall of the Comptoir would be an immense disaster, everyone agrees on that."
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This concern reflected the fact that the CdE was the second oldest chartered bank (after the BdF), the second largest bank of deposit in Paris, the leading source of funding for French foreign trade, a supplier of credit to small and medium Paris businesses, a major investment bank, providing credit to the stock market with substantial off-balance sheet activities, and a manager of important financial operations for the French government.
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The potential threat to the financial system cannot be read in the behavior of interest rates, as these typically do not jump until the panic begins. Responding to cuts in the discount rates of the BdF and the BoE, French market rates were falling in the months immediately preceding the crisis (See Figure 3) . Similarly, when Baer Stearns was rescued from collapse in Empirically it is difficult to measure even an incipient panic because daily deposit data for this period are rare. However, following contemporary studies, bank stock prices can be used to follow the bank run (Wall and Peterson, 1990; Goldsmith-Pinkham and Yorulmazer, 2010) .
Stock prices in Figure 2 reveal how, in early March, the stock of the CdE and to a lesser degree the BPPB were dumped and prices tumbled. Table 2 
The Lifeboat and the Provision of Additional Liquidity
Although the BdF created a lifeboat to preserve the CdE, there may also have been a need to make liquidity generally available to the market. However, it appears to have played a supporting rather than a dominant role in halting a panic. Bignon, Flandreau and Ugolini (2012) show that the hallmark of the BoE's LOLR actions à la Bagehot were to keep the discount rate above the market rate, lending freely to all who had acceptable collateral. White (2007) also provides graphical evidence that the BdF followed a similar discount policy. Figure 3 . The open market rate is believed to represent the rate for the best paper bought by the big banks.
18
Operating in the world's dominant money and capital market, the BoE's discount rate was closely followed by BdF and other central banks; but the BdF with its huge gold reserves did not feel it necessary to respond to every BoE discount rate change. When the BoE raised its rate from 2.5 to 3% in July 1888 and then 4% in August, the BdF responded with a lag, increasing its discount rate from 2.5 to 3.5% on September 13. Falling gold reserves prompted the regents increase their rate to 4.5% on October 4 after the next BoE announcement.
19
These rates remained in force for the next three months. Rates began to drop in early 1889. On January 10, 1889, the regents cut the discount rate to 4%, following the BoE's drop to 4%.
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Then in quick order, shadowing the London rate, the BdF lowered its rate to 3.5% 15 The BdF conducted monetary policy by providing discounts and advances. During the years 1888 and 1889, advances were almost steady at 130 million francs with a standard deviation of 4.5 million, whereas the mean and standard deviation for discounts were 313 million and 89.5 million francs. . 16 Data on the BdF's balance sheets come from Babeau (n.d.) . 17 The Economist's reported rates are for the end of each week (the magazine's source is believed to have been Crédit Lyonnais), whereas the Banque's balance sheet data is mid-week. For example, the Banque's balance sheet is reported for January 24, 1889 while the date of the Economist's rate is January 26, 1889. The rates for discounts and advances are those prevailing that week or the new rate if there was a change. The rates are similar to monthly rates reported in the National Bureau of Economic Research's Macro History database, http://www.nber.org/databases/macrohistory/rectdata/13/m13017.dat. Crédit Lyonnais is quoted as source of the U.S. National Monetary Commission's rates. 18 In addition to the cost of funds, the demand for discounts depended on the Paris Bourse.
Clearing and settlement of trades for the second largest securities market in Europe required substantial funding. While most funding could be obtained from other intermediaries, the BdF and then began to decline in May when the liquidators began to sell off the CdE's assets paying off its creditors, including the BdF.
To determine how much additional liquidity was provided to the Paris market over and above the loans to the CE, the value of private (non-government) discounts outstanding will be modeled as an AR(1) process with the change in log of the private discounts (∆lnPD) depending on the change in the interest rate differential between the BdF's discount rate and the Paris market rate (∆IntDiff). To capture, the demand emanating from the Bourse, we have created a matrix of dummy variables, one for each day of each settlement period, with the mid-month settlement having five days and the end-of-month settlement having six days. The end-of-month settlement was bigger as it handled all government bonds, the bonds of the City of Paris, and shares of the BdF, Crédit Foncier, and all listed railways. It was believed that the biggest demand for liquidity was on the first day when borrowing contracts (reports) were due. The dummies for the five middle-of-the-month settlement days are M1, M2, M3, M4, and M5 and the six end-of month settlement days are E1, E2, E3, E4, E5, E6. Using the Bayesian Information Criterion, the model (equation 1) selected has one lag for the private discounts variable and two lags for interest rate differential variable.
Equation 1 is estimated using weekly data for two separate periods: (1) August 26, 1871
to December 27, 1888 and (2) Table 3 .
For both samples, the lagged dependent variable and the interest rates variables and lagged values all have the expected signs. It is interesting to note that for the dummy variables that are intended to capture the demand from the Bourse, the strongest effect is the first day of the end-of-month settlement---the spikes seen in Figure 4 . The estimates for the longer period are used to predict the discounts given from January through May 1889. The predicted discounts at week t are equal to the actual lagged discounts plus the predicted increase. The additional "Bagehot" liquidity provided by the BdF is equal to the actual discounts less both the predicted discounts and the credits to the CdE.
During the months of January and February 1889, there was no anticipatory increase in discounts, as the model over-predicts the volume of the discounts. Nevertheless, the model under-predicts the increases in discounts for the crisis month of March 1889. There are four weeks---March 14, 21, and 28 and April 4---when there might be considered additional "Bagehot" liquidity being indicated by the model, raising the level of discounts by 49, 79, 44, and 23 million francs. Given the models standard error of 31 million francs for a mean value of 330 million francs of discounts, these are not extraordinarily high values. However, it is notable that the additional 79 million francs of discounts occurred in the same time frame as the second 40 million francs credit to the CdE. Additional liquidity given to the market would be consistent with markets remaining jittery with some bank stock prices taking new hits, as seen in Table 2 . This LOLR activity à la Bagehot appears to be an important complement to the lifeboat operation but not the primary focus of policy. Its magnitude is best seen relative to Paris Bourse demand on the most important settlement day. The average spike in discounts for this day is calculated using this day's regression coefficient, E1. For the full sample, the average E1 day added discounts of 88 million francs, with a range of 74 to 103 million francs, using the 95 percent confidence interval.
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Viewed from this perspective, additional discounts were within the normal augmented demand on the peak settlement day. Thus, it is not surprising that there was no discussion of these discounts in the minutes of either the Council of Regents or other committees. Their attention was riveted on halting the run on the CdE and organizing its recapitalization as the Comptoir National d'Escompte (CNEP).
The Design of the Guarantee Syndicate
The significance of a key feature of the CdE's lifeboat---the two 20 million francs guarantee syndicates pushed by the angry Minister of Finance---has been wholly over looked in previous literature. Their design strongly suggests that the intention was for those behind the copper scheme to bear much of the cost CdE's collapse, which could potentially mitigate the moral hazard arising from aiding the insolvent bank. This action was certainly spurred by the fact that it was widely known that members of the financial community had exploited for personal gain conflicts of interest arising from holding positions at multiple institutions.
Information on 20 million francs guarantee syndicate for the 100 million francs loan is shown in Table 4 .
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The names of the contributing banks are in bold face: their share capital, their rank by the size of their capital relative to all banks in Paris, and their contributions are given in the first four columns; also included are the largest banks that were not part of the syndicate. In this table, the entry for the CdE refers to the assessment not on the bank but on its board of directors. Visual inspection of the size of a contribution and a bank's capital. Instead, the banks involved in the copper scheme seem to have been assessed large contributions. These included small banks, far down the list in terms of their rank size. Two joint-stock banks at the scheme's center-the CdE and PBBP-- This comparison suggests that inclusion in the syndicate and the size of contributions were influenced by a bank's participation in the copper scheme. To identify the conflicted participants in the copper scheme and provide a measure of their involvement, we employ two approaches.
First, we examine the overlapping directorships and management, using network analysis to measure the degree to which institutions were connected and implicitly conflicted. Secondly, to identify conflicted participants, we employ the 1888 subscription list to the SdM's stock and bond issue, which provided the firm with the means to further the copper scheme. The subscriptions to the SdM's stock and bond issue are shown in Table 5 .
For the first approach, we have collected information on all the Paris banks, including limited liability banks, partnerships and proprietorships.
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For the limited liability banks we have identified their CEOs and vice-CEOs (directeurs and sous-directeurs), members of the boards of directors, and their internal auditors (censeurs). For private banks, we identify the lead partners or owners. We have also included the senior management for the SdM. As might be imagined, For the second approach, we measure conflicts of interest by using participation in SdM's issue of shares and bonds that doubled its capital in 1888, facilitating its effort to drive up copper prices.
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The goal was to raise 20 million francs, most of which was taken up by bankers who claimed 15,201,240 francs. As seen in Table 5 , the largest subscriber was Rothschild frères requesting (2,515,000 francs of bonds and 2,500,000 francs of shares). The next largest assessment of contributions to the guarantee syndicate was by institution. Consequently, we use this list to construct three measures of conflicts of interest shown in the columns: (2) the purchases by the managers and directors of a bank and the bank itself, though this leads to some double counting---TC2xSMK, (3) the purchases by a bank or by its managers and directors who had the bank as their primary affiliation (e.g. they were the CEO rather than a member of the board)---PC2xSMK, and (4) the total number of individuals at a bank who made purchases---NS2xSMK.
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To determine if the Minister of Finance sought to use the guarantee syndicate to discipline banks in addition to assessing contributions according to capacity to pay, one could regress the contributions on our measures of conflicts of interest and bank capital. 
30
Membership in the Légion, a high governmental honor, might influence selection into the syndicate if it was believed that they ought to help out in this crisis or if they should or should not be punished for involvement. We include a dummy variable, LL i, to indicate if the bank was a limited liability bank rather than a proprietorship or partnership.
The BdF and the Caisse d'Epargne had many regents and directors investing in the scheme. Given that they were quasi-government institutions, they will not be included in the analysis. It should be noted that the BdF was also potentially penalized as it would have to absorb any losses in excess of the 20 million francs provided by both guarantee syndicates. 29 The guarantee syndicate appears have been required by the Ministry of Finance, though the BdF helped in the negotiation of membership and contributions. 30 Our source is the Annuaire Almanach de Commerce (1888).
OLS estimates with three measures of ‫ܫܥ‬ are shown in Table 6 , displaying the coefficients and the t-statistics.
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For the two reported centrality measures (degree centrality for the CdE in column 1 and degree centrality for SdM in column 4), the estimates are very similar. From a base contribution of approximately 500,000 francs (the constant), a bank capital of 100 million francs added 400,000 francs and each connection to the CdE or for the SdM another 116,000 to 138,000 francs, with neither limited liability nor the Legion d'Honneur playing significant roles.
The OLS estimate (Column 7) that uses the conflict-of-interest's measure drawn from the subscription list (PC2xSMK) captures some relationships missed by the visible networks. Here, the base contribution is nearly the same but the effect of bank capital is lowered, so that 100 million francs of capital only adds another 100,000 francs to a contribution while a one million franc subscription adds 407,000 francs. Thus, the Rothschilds who bought 5 million francs of the SdM issue, have 2 million of their 3 million francs contribution explained by this variable.
However, the challenge in estimating this model is that selection into the syndicate was not random. Although the syndicate was organized in haste, it may be reasonable to presume---especially given hard negotiation in the late night meeting---that the Ministry first identified banks that should be members of the syndicate (reflecting both capacity to pay and guilt) and then determined their contributions (perhaps weighting guilt more heavily). The correct approach to this problem is to pursue a two stage regression approach, where the first stage estimates the determinants of being induced to join the syndicate and the second estimates the determinants of the contribution to the syndicate, with a Heckman correction for the selection bias.
31 The other conflict of interest measures yield similar results. The first stage of analysis will be a probit regression, specified in equation 3, to examine the determinants of membership. Membership of the ith bank in the guarantee syndicate, M i is
There are 98 observations to estimate the probit model but only 19 for equation 2. As is well known, there are problems with the small sample properties for models that correct for selection bias; however, the results are similar to the OLS estimates. There is one more cautionary note; the potential explanatory variables are the same for both equations 2 and 3, so that there are no obvious instruments to identify them. However, when we use LH i and LL i, to identify the membership equation, LL i, appears to do the job while having no influence on the OLS estimates. In spite of these problems, the combined equations predict the allocation of contributions fairly well.
In equation 3, the limited liability variable is negative and significant in all three specifications (Columns 2, 5 and 8), with a marginal effect to the probability of 25%, implying that the haute banque rather than the limited liability banks were considered to bear more responsibility for undermining the CdE. Share capital has a significant effect and the unreported average marginal effect ranges from 0.008 to 0.011, implying that an extra 1 million francs of capital would increase the probability of selection by 0.8 to 1.1%. One additional overlapping directorship or official with the CdE, increased the probability of selection into the guarantee syndicate by 3.1%. The effect for the SdM variable was 3.8%. An additional subscription of 1 million francs increased the probability of selection by 3.6 percent. Taken all together, they imply that, if a bank was a limited liability one, it would be only included in the syndicate if it were very large, with a copper scheme association adding to the likelihood. For the haute banque deep involvement in the copper scheme was the key factor. The columns 3, 6 and 9 of Table 6 reports the combined equations in a Heckman selection model using the same conflictof-interests' measures as in the other columns. Once membership to the syndicate is accounted for, the constant term is smaller and the effects of capital and all three conflict of interest variables are similar to the contribution equation estimated by OLS.
As the chosen subscription variable (PC2xSMK) appears to better capture some important relationships, the model estimates from Columns 8 and 9 in Table 6 are used to generate estimated contributions in Column 6 of Given this evidence, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the apportionment of potential losses from the collapse of the CdE was intended to fall heaviest upon those deeply involved in the copper scheme.
Aftermath and Cleanup: Setting Incentives
The SdM filed for bankruptcy on March 21, 1889, under a new legal procedure (liquidation judiciaire) that halted payments to creditors, while the firm continued in operation.
As Although the CdE still had its finances entangled with the SdM, which had to resolve claims from the mines and other creditors, the BdF accepted a final payment for settlement with the CdE, by cutting the interest payments it was due.
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Thus, the guarantee syndicates were not called upon to make the BdF whole, thanks primarily to the unexpected recovery of copper prices. The BdF also cleaned its house of conflicted senior officials. Two internal auditors, P. Tessionnière and Ernest Baudelot, who had been on the board of the CdE were dismissed (Banque de France, Assemblée Générale, 1889).
To resurrect the CdE and minimize disruption to the Paris market, the Minister of Finance and the BdF promoted a new Comptoir National d'Escompte de Paris (CNEP). The CdE's head office, branches and clientele were sold to this reincarnation in exchange for 40,000 founders' 35 To this debt was added 1.5 million francs that Sécretan owed the BdF.
This favourable outcome was not anticipated by the BdF. At its 1889 General Assembly, the Governor announced that while the 100 million francs would be repaid, it would necessary to establish a 4 million francs reserve against potential losses on the remaining credits to the CdE.
shares in the CNEP that were distributed to the former shareholders of the CE for their acquiescence. The CNEP was founded with a capital of 40 million francs, half of which was paid in; and Louis Jules Ernest Denormandie, a former Governor of the BdF, assumed the office of president. The capital was almost entirely subscribed by the former shareholders of the CdE. In Secrétan's agreement with the SdM's liquidators, he ceded almost all his property, worth 5.7 million francs. The liquidators of the CdE and the SdM pursued the boards of the companies. Faced with a law suit, the members of the CdE's board settled with a payment of 24 million francs; and the liquidators of the SdM extracted 50 million francs from its former board members. As CEO of the CdE, Hentsch was the subject of an additional law suit by the liquidators because of his "special responsibility" which was settled by a payment of 1.6 million francs (Le Figaro, January 3, 1891) . Perhaps most serious, for all board members, were suits arising from Article 1382 of the Civil Code that permitted current and former shareholders to obtain damages when the companies were determined to have engaged in false accounting and 37 Although the criminal courts dropped the accaparement, charge, the civil courts did not and use it to nullify the forward contracts, appealing to Articles 6 and 1382 of the Civil Code.
distribution of fictitious dividends. Payment was compelled, as failure could result in prison, and some board members went bankrupt, while others like Secrétan and Hentsch were financially ruined (Jannet, 1892) .
Lessons from History?
Attempting to draw strong lessons from any historical episode is difficult given that circumstances vary from crisis to crisis, but the events of 1888-1889 do offer valuable insights into the conduct of a central bank that was able to pre-emptively limit the damage from the collapse of a "systemically important financial institution." However, one caveat should be offered at the outset. Financial crises in the nineteenth century, in France, the U.S. and elsewhere, usually had their origins in the exploitation of conflicts of interest by one or few institutions. Adopted in the mid-to late twentieth century, systemic incentives to take risk, arising from deposit insurance, Too-Big-To-Fail and other policy-originated incentives have magnified the shocks to the financial system, making the tasks of a LOLR more difficult.
In spite of the different environment of the late nineteenth century, this pre-emptive action by the BdF, prompted by the Minister of Finance, is notable. The central bank engineered a lifeboat to rescue the CdE in 1889 so that it could be liquidated in an orderly fashion and a new CNEP could be organized. Backed by a discount window that readily provided loans to a troubled market, a general panic was prevented by this lifeboat operation. The BdF---with no promise of any funds from the government---offered the insolvent CdE large loans collateralized by questionable assets. The central bank was protected from losses by a guarantee syndicate of bankers that was coerced to give guarantees of 40 million francs against losses the BdF might sustain. Court decisions nullifying forward contracts and the subsequent rise in the price of copper reduced losses to the CdE made the deployment of the guarantee syndicate unnecessary.
contemporaries knew, the danger from this intervention was that it might encourage banks to take bigger risks in the future in the knowledge that the BdF would come to their rescue. The assignment of shares in the guarantee syndicate and the legal system's punitive responses would have mitigated the moral hazard, though the precise effects are hard to measure. While one cannot easily run a counterfactual, these actions may have contributed to the absence of further French financial crises in the pre-1914 era.
